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ESSAYS
CIVIL LIBERTIES VS. NATIONAL SECURITY:
THE ENDURING TENSION
FRANCIs CARDINAL GEORGE, O.M.I.*
The tension between national security and civil liberties can
best be illustrated by a common line heard in the weeks after
September 11, 2001. Once the period of mourning came to a
close, the question arose how life would ever return to normal.
For example, 'there was even talk of canceling, and not just post-
poning, the World Series. But if that happened, many people
said, "the terrorists would have won," for it was the terrorists'
whole purpose to disrupt daily life and to turn the United States
into a militaristic nation so completely hostile to Islam that a full-
scale clash of civilizations would have been unleashed. So, gradu-
ally people went about their ordinary lives, often saying to them-
selves that otherwise "the terrorists would have won." So
common did this phrase become that The New Yorker satirized this
tic with a cartoon of two men in a bar, and one says to the other,
"I figure if I don't have that third Martini, then the terrorists
win. '
But of course if nothing had changed after 9/11, if airport
screening had remained as lackadaisical as before, if student visas
were not now being more thoroughly checked, if flight schools
were still able to register suspiciously motivated students, if cock-
pit doors were not more securely bolted and reinforced, and if,
as a result of such willful negligence, another hijacking had
occurred, then that too would mean, in a far more glaring way,
that the terrorists would have won, precisely by inflicting on the
unsuspecting public another outrage.
Both points are, I think, obvious: on the one hand, we don't
want to abandon the very traits of our country-religious free-
dom, free speech, civilian control of the military, freedom of
* Archbishop of Chicago. S.T.D. (Ecclesiology), Pontifical Urban Uni-
versity, Rome; Ph.D. (American Philosophy), Tulane University.
1. The Cartoon Issue, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 12, 2001, at 98.
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movement, freedom from excessive government intrusion in our
daily lives, and so forth-that were themselves the very reason for
the attack by the terrorists. But we also cannot afford to ignore
the dangers of the current environment and pretend that the
malevolence of our enemies cannot exploit the very openness of
our open society to further their evil ends.
Without specifying policy recommendations, does the collec-
tive wisdom of the Church have something to offer in this debate
on the tension between national security and civil liberties?
I.
Almost from its inception, philosophy has been marked by a
debate between idealists and realists-including in the political
order. Now, vague as these terms are in metaphysics and episte-
mology, they are models of clarity compared to how they are
used in politics. For in metaphysics, despite the endless varia-
tions that one can play on the implications of each position, "ide-
alism" generally refers to the priority given to the rational, the
mental, the world of ideas over that of brute matter, while "real-
ism" means crediting the material world with more metaphysical
status than the idealist would allow. Similarly, in epistemology
"idealism" insists that whatever data come at the subject from the
outside "real" world are so significantly changed by the exper-
iencing subject that the experience of the real must be regarded
as essentially subjective (that is, "ideal"), whereas "realism" holds
that the outside world is itself so real that it cannot help but
impinge on subjective experience, so that the subject may relia-
bly trust in the reality of the external source of experience.
But in politics, the matter is somewhat more confused.
There "idealism" refers to what is most often meant by that term
in ordinary language, as does also the term "realism." Ordinarily,
the terms mean, respectively, concern for ideal norms like 'jus-
tice," "peace," and the like, in contrast to the view that gives pri-
ority to those realities of the human animal, like self-interest and
greed, that undermine the ideal. In the words of Reinhold
Niebuhr, that famous Christian "realist," the matter may be
described as follows:
The terms "idealism" and '!realism" are not analogous in
political and in metaphysical theory; and they are certainly
not as precise in political as in metaphysical theory. In
political and moral theory, "realism" denotes the disposi-
tion to take all factors in a social and political situation,
which offer resistance to established norms, into account,
particularly the factors of self interest and power. . . . "Ide-
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alism," is, in the esteem of its proponents, characterized by
loyalty to moral norms and ideals, rather than to self-inter-
est, whether individual or collective. It is, in the opinion of
its critics, characterized by a disposition to ignore or be
indifferent to the forces in human life which offer resis-
tance to universally valid ideals and norms .... The defini-
tions of "realists" and "idealists" emphasize disposition,
rather than doctrines; and they are therefore bound to be
inexact.
2
That same inexactitude pervades the debate over how much our
civil liberties need to be restricted in order to preserve our
national security. For that reason one would be led astray by tak-
ing the terms "idealism" and "realism" as binary terms, much the
way "liberal" and "conservative" are regarded in contemporary
discourse. For when taken to their logical conclusions, the ideal-
ist position can suddenly find itself driven to the grimmest ver-
sion of realism. For example, Niccolo Machiavelli is often taken
to be the arch-realist of all political thought because of his dic-
tum that political thought must follow the truth of the matter
rather than the imagination (meaning that when utopian ideals
conflict with sober reality, the statesman must follow reality).3
Plato, by contrast, is usually seen as the arch-idealist, who insisted
on the prior rights of the imagination to think of an ideal repub-
lic in order to judge the grubby reality of the present and reform
it on that basis. In the Republic, Plato "ideally" imagines the
guardians of the state being sequestered in private quarters, with
family responsibilities absolved (or at least reduced to a mini-
mum), lest the very forces of self-interest that Machiavelli saw as
the engine of the state take over.4 But was that very prescription
itself not a concession to reality, a concession on Plato's part that
the mind alone cannot be trusted to maintain moral norms but
must rely on the compulsory powers of social training? And did
notJoseph Stalin's ideal of the New Soviet Man not lead to a vast
pyramid of corpses for its attempted realization?
Notice how the same dynamic of les extremes se touchent also
affects the debate on civil liberties and national security. The
noted liberal intellectual and biographer of Isaiah Berlin,
Michael Ignatieff, might serve as our Plato here.5 In his recent
2. Reinhold Niebuhr, Augustine's Political Realism, in THE ESSENTIAL REIN-
HOLD NIEBUHR: SELECTED ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 123-24 (Robert McAfee Brown
ed., 1986).
3. See generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Harvey C. Mansfield
trans., 2d ed. 1998).
4. PLA-rO, THE REPUBLIC, bk. V, at 190-97 (A.D. Lindsay trans., 1950).
5. See generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, ISAIAH BERLIN: A LIFE (1999).
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book, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror,6 Ignatieff,
the director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at
Harvard University, discusses issues even more ominous than the
curtailment of such civil liberties as freedom from search and
seizure at airports: preemptive war, targeted assassinations, indef-
inite imprisonment without due process, and so forth-all in the
cause of defending our civil liberties, indeed of defending
democracy itself. This book does not pertain exactly to the topic
of this article, but the nature of the dilemma posed by it bears, I
think, on the issue before us. As Ronald Steele, the reviewer of
this book in the New York Times, noted:
A good part of this dense and often legalistic book is
devoted to hair-splitting over how much lesser evil a society
can tolerate and still consider itself virtuous or, for that
matter, even democratic. When we are satisfied that the
coercive measures we take are a "genuine last resort" and if
we are able to "justify our actions publicly to our fellow citi-
zens" and if our repressive actions (like holding suspects
without trial or counsel) do "actually enhance security,"
Ignatieff writes, then we have chosen the lesser evil. And
presumably, we can feel satisfied. Given that a frightened
public will tolerate inflicting just about any amount of
repression in the name of security, Ignatieff's traffic sign
seems to mean "proceed but with caution." And his assur-
ance that "democracy itself' will keep a lesser evil from
becoming a "greater evil" should ease our collective con-
science when we remember that "either we fight evil with
evil or we succumb." 7
It seems to me that the question of the tension between civil
liberties and national security cannot be answered except by first
meeting the challenge posed by Ronald Steel's critique of the
Ignatieff book: How much restriction on our civil liberties must
be endured-lest we succumb to a worse evil-exposure to State
terrorism, which itself represents a violation of liberty and free-
dom, of the right to life and freedom of movement?
This debate has actually been a part of U.S. history almost
from the beginning, starting with the Alien and Sedition Acts of
1798,8 reaching one climax in Abraham Lincoln's suspension of
6. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF
TERROR (2004).
7. Ronald Steel, Fight Fire with Fire, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., July 25, 2004, at
13 (reviewing MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE
OF TERROR (2004)).
8. Encarta Online provides a brief historical overview of the Acts:
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the writ of habeas corpus in 1861, with the concurrence of Con-
gress in 1863,' reaching another climax with Franklin Roosevelt's
Alien and Sedition Acts, in American political history, [were] four
laws passed in 1798. The Naturalization Act, raising from 5 to 14 the
number of years of United States residence required for naturaliza-
tion, was repealed in 1802. The Alien Act, empowering the president
to arrest and deport any alien considered dangerous, expired in 1800.
The Alien Enemies Act, which expired in 1801, provided for the arrest
and deportation of subjects of foreign powers at war with the United
States. The Sedition Act made it a criminal offense to print or publish
false, malicious, or scandalous statements directed against the U.S.
government, the president, or Congress; to foster opposition to the
lawful acts of Congress; or to aid a foreign power in plotting against
the United States. Although the Sedition Act enacted some reforms in
the existing law of seditious libel-evidence of the truth of the alleged
libel could be pleaded in justification its penalties were severe: impris-
onment for up to five years and fines up to $5,000.
The Alien and Sedition Acts were enacted by a Congress domi-
nated by the Federalist Party and signed by PresidentJohn Adams dur-
ing the war crisis with France that followed publication of the XYZ
letters (see XYZ Affair). These documents had revealed that French
officials had demanded bribes from American diplomats in Paris as a
condition for negotiations to preserve the peace between the two
nations.
The Naturalization and Alien Acts were aimed largely at Irish
immigrants and French refugees who had participated in political
activities critical of the Adams administration. The Sedition Act was
an attempt to curb newspaper editors who supported the Republican
Party and who, in many cases, were also immigrants and refugees. The
duration of the law (until March 3, 1801) indicated that its purpose
was to obstruct Republican Party activities during the presidential elec-
tion of 1800. Before it expired, about 25 people were arrested and
about 10 were convicted. Some of them were later pardoned.
The most prominent opponents of the Alien and Sedition Acts
were the Republican Party leaders, Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison. They drafted, respectively, the Kentucky and Virginia Reso-
lutions of 1798 as part of their campaigns to protest Federal violations
of civil liberties and Federal restrictions on the freedom of the press
clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The resolu-
tions also became important in American political history after 1830 as
precedents to justify the doctrine of nullification (the principle that
the states could nullify federal laws). The Alien and Sedition Acts
were widely unpopular and played a major role in both the downfall of
the Federalist Party and the election of Jefferson to the presidency in
1800.
Alien and Sedition Acts, in MICROSOFr ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2005, at
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia 761559286/Alien and Sedition Acts.
html (last visited Feb. 10, 2005) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy).
9. "In a curiously passive voice, the Constitution stipulates that the writ of
habeas corpus 'shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it.' This provision appears in Article I,
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imprisonment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, and
culminating now both in the USA PATRIOT Act of October 2001
and in the imprisonment of suspected terrorist "enemy combat-
ants" in Guantanamo Bay after the defeat of the Taliban in
Afghanistan in 2002.0
The persistence of this often-sorry record testifies not just to
the violation of civil liberties that so often follows in the wake of
national panic but also to a real dilemma that lurks behind all
statecraft: How (using the above philosophical terminology) can
we reconcile idealism and realism in establishing and governing
any particular polity? Without offering any specific expertise to
lawmakers and citizens seeking to address this dilemma, the Pas-
toral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World asserts:
Often enough the Christian view of things will itself suggest
some specific solution in certain circumstances. Yet it hap-
pens rather frequently, and legitimately so, that with equal
sincerity some of the faithful will disagree with others on a
given matter. Even against the intentions of their propo-
nents, however, solutions proposed on one side or another
which otherwise specifies the powers of Congress (executive powers are laid out
in Article II)." James M. McPherson, The Greatest Republican, N.Y. REv. BooKs,
Aug. 12, 2004, at 22 (reviewing inter alia MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL:
POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2004)). On the basis of its location in
the Constitution, the provision for suspension prompted Chief Justice Taney to
rule that only Congress could suspend the writ. Lincoln insisted that suspen-
sion was an emergency power intended to be exercised by the Commander in
Chief in time of war. According to McPherson:
[S]everal legal authorities wrote essays endorsing Lincoln's position,
while Taney, as the author of the Dred Scott decision, commanded little
respect in the North. Later in the war, military tribunals in Ohio and
Indiana did indeed convict several Northern civilians ... of aiding and
abetting Confederate agents operating behind Union lines. After the
war the Supreme Court in Ex pane Milligan voided the Indiana convic-
tions on the ground that military courts could not try civilians when
civil courts were open and functioning, as they were in Indiana during
the war.
Id. This decision has obvious relevance to the recent Supreme Court decisions
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, and Rasul v. Bush, dealing with the issue
of imprisonment of suspected and apprehended terrorists without due process
of law. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124
S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
10. Please note that in reciting these various acts of the government in
times of crisis, I am not equating them or lumping them into one basket, either
of governmental iniquity or of expediency. The internment ofJapanese-Ameri-
cans was a particularly egregious example of governmental abuse of civil liber-
ties... while as we saw in the footnote immediately above, Lincoln's suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus was widely supported by Unionists (or at least
Unionist Republicans) in his day and continues to be defended by respectable
Civil War historians down to today.
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may be easily confused by many people with the Gospel
message. Hence it is necessary for people to remember
that no one is allowed in the aforementioned situations to
appropriate the Church's authority for his opinion. They
should always try to enlighten one another through honest
discussion, preserving mutual charity and caring above all
for the common good.'
All well and good. But the role of a teacher of the Catholic faith
cannot end just there. For if the debate is cast in terms of "ideal-
ism" and "realism," then the wisdom of the Catholic tradition of
political thought has something very valuable to offer. For that
reason, I would like to offer a specifically theological perspective
on the tension between idealism and realism in the political
order, considering how Augustine, that famous Christian "real-
ist," interpreted the reality of the Earthly City when set against the
idea of the City of God. As Reinhold Niebuhr says so well of
Augustine's masterpiece on this theme:
Augustine was, by general consent, the first great "realist"
in Western history. He deserves this distinction because
his picture of social reality in his Civitas Dei gives an ade-
quate account of the social factions, tensions, and competi-
tions which we know to be well-nigh universal on every
level of community; while the classical age conceived the
order and justice of its polis to be a comparatively simple
achievement, which would be accomplished when reason
had brought all subrational forces under its dominion.1"
11. The Second Council of the Vatican, Gaudium et Spes (Pastoral Consti-
tution on the Church in the Modern World), in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II
244 (Walter M. Abbott &Joseph Gallagher trans. & eds., 1966). William Tem-
ple, one of the twentieth century's great Archbishops of Canterbury, made
roughly the same point when he objected to certain official positions being
proposed by his fellow Anglican bishops in these wise words:
[It is] a matter of justice [for the Church to respect the legitimate
diversity of prudential political judgments], for even though a large
majority of Christians hold a particular view, the dissentient minority
may be equally loyal to Christ and equally entitled to be recognised as
loyal members of his Church .... [I] f any member of the convocation
of York should be so ill-advised as to [insist] that these proposals be
adopted as a political programme for the Church, I should in my
capacity as Archbishop resist that proposal with all my force, and
should probably, as President of the Convocation, rule it out of order.
The Church is committed to the everlasting gospel and to the Creeds
which formulate it; it must never commit itself to an ephemeral pro-
gramme of detailed action.
WiLuIAM TEMPLE, CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL ORDER 28-29 (1956).
12. Reinhold Niebuhr, Augustine's Political Realism, in THE Crrm OF GOD: A
COLLECTION OF CRITICAL EssAys 120 (Dorothy F. Donnelly ed., 1995).
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Pervading the whole debate in this country on civil liberties (and
I would maintain that this holds true even when concerns of
national security are not part of the picture), a certain naivet4e
reigns in the minds of civil libertarians, who often seem to imi-
tate the classical age at least in regarding civil liberties as a "com-
paratively simple achievement." Civil liberties lobbies like the
ACLU or Human Rights Watch tend to absolutize civil liberties
precisely because they seem to have little understanding of why
states are obligated to respect liberty in the first place. Why is
man free? Or in other words, why are we endowed by our Crea-
tor with certain inalienable rights, chief among them the rights
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Why is the state obli-
gated to respect human rights and not intrude in areas of con-
science, thought, speech, and belief? According to Augustine, all
our liberties are ordered to God, whose pursuit alone can bring
happiness; and the chief enemy of that pursuit is not the state
(even an oppressive one) but ourselves. In contrast to both class-
ical and modern theories of the self, Augustine maintains that it
is not the bad body (conceived as either nature-determined or
nurture-determined) that causes the good soul to sin but the bad
soul causes the good body to sin. Modern presuppositions hold
otherwise, as Niebuhr wisely points out:
Compared with a Christian realism, which is based on
Augustine's interpretation of biblical faith, a great many
modern social and psychological theories, which fancy
themselves anti-Platonic or even anti-Aristotelian and
which make much of their pretended "realism," are in fact
no more realistic than the classical philosophers. Thus
modern social and psychological scientists are forever seek-
ing to isolate some natural impulse such as "aggressive-
ness" and to manage it; with equal vanity they are trying to
find a surrogate for Plato's and Aristotle's disinterested
"reason" in so-called "scientific method." Their inability to
discover the corruption of self-interest in reason or in man's
rational pursuits, and to measure the spiritual dimension of
man's inhumanity and cruelty, gives an air of sentimental-
ity to the learning of our whole liberal culture. Thus we
have no guidance amid the intricacies of modern power
politics, except as the older disciplines, less enamored of
the "methods of natural science," and the common sense
of the man in the street, supply the necessary insights.'
We live in an era when civil liberties have become an abso-
lute for a large swath of the public, especially among secular
13. Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
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intellectuals. But this for Augustine makes no sense. As an
abstraction, freedom is not an absolute, for freedom is only free-
dom for a value, and if that value is self-interest alone, then we
immure ourselves within the walls of the Earthly City and are left
completely flummoxed when raw malice appears in the guise of
terrorism. The tension between national security and civil liber-
ties will thus never be resolved until Americans first get clear as
to why the Creator has endowed us with freedom. In other
words, when civil liberties are absolutized, then we are left with-
out a conceptual armory to judge when and where they must be
curtailed, either for the greater good or for the defense of the
nation against enemies who worm their way into the polity pre-
cisely by exploiting those very liberties for their nefarious ends.
II.
Of course that insight alone does not resolve anything
either, for the dilemma still faces us and still demands a practical
answer. What do we do in specific situations? What laws are
legitimate responses (for example, heightened security at air-
ports) and which are clear imitations of the totalitarian enemy we
oppose in the name of our freedoms (for example, the intern-
ment of Japanese-Americans in World War II)? However, there
too the Catholic tradition has insights to bring to the conversa-
tion that could begin to provide a moral calculus enabling
lawmakers and citizens to address this issue. I am referring here
to that aspect of the moral wisdom of the Catholic Church that
goes under the name of casuistry.
Admittedly, in the wake of Blaise Pascal's withering critique
of Jesuit casuistry in the seventeen century in his Provincial Let-
ters," casuistry has become identified in the public mind with
pettifoggery, hairsplitting, and legalism. Certainly casuistry,
when wrongly practiced, can lead to such abuses. But the dismis-
sal of casuistry tout court can lead to its own severe problems;
above all, it leads here to the absolutization of civil liberties and
to the inability to see how such an absolutization can lead to pre-
cisely the dilemmas we see operative today. Under that rubric
debate goes nowhere, with one side certain that any curtailment
of civil liberties sets us down the long road to totalitarianism,
while the other side is willing to countenance any curtailment in
the name of security. Perhaps this is why ethical and political
debate in our country has become so shrill. As Alasdair
Maclntyre has noted:
14. Bt asE PAScAL, THE PROVINCIAL LETrERS 194-212 (O.W. Wight ed.,
Thomas McCrie trans., Hurd and Houghton 1875) (Letter V).
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It is easy also to understand why protest becomes a distinc-
tive moral feature of the modem age and why indignation
is a predominant modern emotion .... Protest is now
almost entirely that negative phenomenon which charac-
teristically occurs as a reaction to the alleged invasion of
someone's rights in the name of someone else's utility. The
self-assertive shrillness of protest arises because .. protes-
tors can never win an argument; the indignant self-right-
eousness of protest arises because .. the protestors can
never lose an argument either. Hence the utterance of
protest is characteristically addressed to those who already
share the protestors' premises .... Protestors rarely have
anyone else to talk to but themselves. This is not to say that
protest cannot be effective; it is to say that it cannot be
rationally effective."
This passage will no doubt strike a chord of recognition in all
hearts, but few, I suspect, will attribute the reason for this dolor-
ous state of affairs to the demise of casuistry. But what is the
application of just-war theory but casuistry? How else can one
strike a balance between liberty and equality, between rights and
duties, except by casuistry? How else can political compromise-
or even political debate and conversation-be at all morally pos-
sible except on the basis that absolute principles often conflict
and that hard cases, while they often make for bad law, also make
for acute moral analysis? That is how casuistry first arose: by the
consideration of hard cases. First adumbrated, at least in the
West, by Aristotle,16 then explicitly mooted by the Stoics and
picked up by Cicero, it entered Catholic thinking with Pope
15. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 68-69 (1981).
16. According to Aristotle:
[L]aw is always a general statement, yet there are cases which it is not
possible to cover in a general statement.... [T]his does not make it
[the general statement] a wrong law; the error is not in the law nor in
the lawgiver, but in the nature of the case. the material of conduct is
essentially irregular. When therefore the law lays down a general rule,
and thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the rule, it is then
right, where the lawgiver's pronouncement because of its absoluteness
is defective and erroneous, to rectify the defect by deciding as the law-
giver would himself decide if he were present on the occasion.... This
is the essential nature of the equitable: it is a rectification of law where law is
defective because of its generality. For what is itself indefinite can only be
measured by an indefinite standard, like the leaden rule used by Les-
bian builders; just as that rule is not rigid but can be bent to the shape
of the stone, so a special ordinance is made to fit the circumstances of
the case.
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHmics, bk. V, ch. x, 11. 3-7, at 315-17 (T.E. Page
et al. eds., 1934) (1137b) (emphasis added).
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Gregory the Great, 17 was fully developed by St. Thomas Aqui-
nas, 18 and then gradually entered a period of decadence, until
Pascal administered the coup de grace with his Provincial Letters.
Pascal engaged in his polemics for good reason, tor he spot-
ted what was becoming increasingly obvious anyway: that casu-
istry was rapidly devolving into what we now call "situation
ethics," which countenances no instance of human behavior that
could be called inherently evil (malum in se) and where intention
17. ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, MORALS ON THE BOOK OF JOB, vol. 3, pt. 2,
bk. 32, ch. 36-38, at 538-40 (Members of the English Church trans., John
Henry Parker 1850). The cases Pope Gregory adduces are three: (1) Two men
promise to be completely honest with one another but to tell no one else what
they share with each other; then one finds out the other is planning to murder
someone: does he break his promise or become an accessory to murder? (2) A
man enters a monastery to avoid the temptations of secular life, but the abbot
appoints him the monks' negotiator with tradesmen: does he disobey the order
or, by obeying, expose himself to the temptations of secular life? (3) A priest
gets a parish assignment through bribery but then repents of his sin: should he
give up his "ill-gotten gains" or keep the parish lest his parishioners go without
spiritual care? Actually, Pope Gregory I should not really be regarded as the
first Christian casuist; that accolade should in fact go to St. Paul, as his wrestling
with the issue of a marriage between a pagan and a Christian, 1 Corinthians 7,
and food sacrificed to idols, I Corinthians 8, amply attest.
18. According to St. Thomas:
It would seem that theologians should not take note of the circum-
stances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider human
acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it
seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a
thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is outside it, but
by that which is in it. Therefore, theologians should not take note of
the circumstances of acts.... On the contrary, I answer that the theo-
logian considers human acts according as they are found to be good
or evil, better or worse; and this diversity depends on circumstances.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II, q. 7, art. 2, obj. 1 & respondeo,
at 623-24 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics
1981) (emphasis added). Similarly:
It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a circumstance.
For circumstances stand around (circumstant) an action, as being
outside it .... But good and evil are in things themselves, as is stated in
Metaph. vi. 4. Therefore an action does not derive goodness or malice
from a circumstance.... On the contrary... human actions are good
or evil according to circumstances . .. [for] [e]very accident is not
accidentally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these
every art takes notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions
are considered in the doctrine of morals.
AQUINAS, supra, I-1I, q. 18, art. 3., obj. 1 & respondeo & ad. 2, at 664-65 (empha-
sis added). An "accidental accident" would be something like the color of
someone's skin, which has no bearing on the humanity of the person, while a
"proper accident" would be the color chosen by an artist when painting a sun-
set, which directly affects the quality of the painting.
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counts for everything.1 9 Like the attempt of certain Jesuits in
Pascal's time to exonerate even dueling, adultery, gossip, and
other vices of the royal courts of Europe (where they often
served as confessors),"O situation ethics rapidly declined into an
ethics of sentimentality, where one only had to have the inten-
tion of "love or sincerity" to exonerate any deed.
Abuses of casuistry undoubtedly form part of its sad history.
Unfortunately, that does not absolve us from the human condi-
tion, where abstract principles of moral value often conflict, as
we see so vividly in the newly dangerous world we now inhabit
after 9/11.
Let us see how a casuistical analysis of the USA PATRIOT
Act might work in practice. Passed in October, 2001, by a vote of
357 to 66 in the House of Representatives and by 98 to 1 in the
Senate, the Act tried above all to address a problem that had
bedeviled the fight against terrorism in this country using laws
(and a political climate) that were designed to address an earlier
abuse of governmental investigative powers when the FBI, during
the years of J. Edgar Hoover, spied on Martin Luther King and
other Americans whose politics Hoover found distasteful. In
response, a wall was created to divide intelligence-gathering capa-
bilities from criminal investigations. But that is just what the ter-
rorists exploited, as Andrew McCarthy, the prosecuting attorney
of the twelve Muslim terrorists who bombed the World Trade
Center in 1993, explains in his overview of what led from that
event to the destruction of the same buildings in 2001:
It was mid-August 2001, the last desperate days before the
9/11 terrorist attacks. Desperate, that is, for an alert agent
of the FBI's Foreign Counterintelligence Division (FCI);
much of the rest of America, and certainly much of the rest
of its government, blithely carried on, content to assume,
despite the number and increasing ferocity of terrorist
attacks dating back nearly nine years, that national security
was little more than an everyday criminal-justice issue.
Since 1995 a "wall" had been erected, presumptively bar-
ring communications between FCI agents and their coun-
terparts in law enforcement .... This FCI agent collided,
head-on, with the wall, and strewn in the wreckage was the
last, best hope of stopping 9/11. Putting disconnected
clues together, the agent had deduced that two Al Qaeda
operatives ... had probably gotten into the U.S. Alarmed,
he pleaded with the FBI's criminal division to help him
19. See, e.g., PASCAL, supra note 14, at 266-391 (Letters IX-XV).
20. Id. at 230-42, 266-283, 284-302 (Letters VII, IX, X).
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hunt down the terrorists-but they refused. For agents to
fuse their information and efforts would be a transgression
against the wall. The prescient agent rued that, one day
soon, people would die in the face of this paralyzing road-
block. [The infiltrators] remained undetected until they
plunged Flight 77 into the Pentagon on 9/11.21
I cite Mr. McCarthy's views not so much to endorse them as to
validate his wider point: that an absolutization of civil liberties as
an unalloyed good with its own self-justifying teleology will leave
us blind to wider realities. Moreover, the dilemma he points to,
and which the USA PATRIOT Act tried to address, cannot be
addressed except by a reformulation of the supposed absolutes of
autonomous individualism into a more nuanced casuistical
approach.
A similar casuistical perspective might also illuminate the
recent Supreme Court decisions on the inmates in Guantanamo
Bay.22 These decisions are in fact highly ambiguous, no doubt
because of the unprecedented nature of the crimes committed
and also because of the unusual status of the prisoners, who do
not belong to duly constituted armies of nation states or to ordi-
nary criminal bands like the Mafia and drug cartels. These cir-
cumstances underlie the analysis of Ronald Dworkin, the
professor of constitutional law in New York University and Uni-
versity College in London:
Though the Court did insist that, even in war, executive
detention of suspected enemy combatants must be subject
to some form of review by a neutral tribunal, it suggested
rules of procedure for any such review that omit important
traditional protections for people accused of crimes. The
government may well be able to satisfy the Court's lenient
procedural standards without actually altering its morally
dubious detention policies. But in the longer run, the
Court's decisions might prove to have a more profound
impact, because the justices' arguments provide the legal
basis for a much more powerful conclusion than the Court
itself drew-that the Constitution does not permit the gov-
ernment to hold suspected enemy combatants or terrorists
indefinitely without charging and convicting them of
crimes, according them all the traditional protections of
our criminal law process, unless they are treated in effect as
21. Andrew C. McCarthy, The Patriot Act Without Tears: Understanding a
Mythologized Law, NAT'L Rrv., June 14, 2004, at 32.
22. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.
Ct. 2633 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
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prisoners of war. They would then have the benefits of
protections allowed by international law, including the
Geneva Conventions. 23
Again, I am neither endorsing nor criticizing either the Supreme
Court decisions or Professor Dworkin's analysis, but I would like
to point to the inevitability of something like this balanced
approach, as outlined both in the decisions and in Prof. Dwor-
kin's analysis. In other words, what we find in both (even if both
the Court and Dworkin are unaware of it) is an analysis based on
the inability of the law to reconcile the tension between civil lib-
erties and national security except by a prior cognizance of the
concrete situation currently facing the country at this stage of its
history. As the horizons of each civilization expand and as the
world itself grows into one global community, the dangers to a
morally based legal order become even more acute.
Would it be too much to hope today that society might be
moving back to Augustine's Christian realism? As he so acutely
said, the world community, as it grows into one global village, will
grow more iniquitous: "After the state or city comes the world,
the third circle of human society-the first being the house, and
the second the city. And the world, as it is larger, so it is fuller of
dangers, as the greater sea is the more dangerous."2 4 Seeing the
danger, Augustine himself created a method that mediates
between moral idealism and political realism. It addresses the
tensions between civil liberties and national security without
denying moral absolutes or elevating the interest of the moment
to their level, in other words, without resolving their tensions in a
prior fashion. It also presupposes a climate of public civility in
which casuistic agreement can be made on its own terms, without
manipulation.
23. Ronald Dworkin, What the Court Really Said, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Aug. 12,
2004, at 26.
24. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE Crry or GOD, bk. XIX, ch. 7, at 683 (Marcus Dods
trans., Modern Library 1950).
